Cure after Breach of Contract under the Restatement(Second) of Contracts: An Analytical Comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code by Lawrence, William H.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1986
Cure after Breach of Contract under the
Restatement(Second) of Contracts: An Analytical
Comparison with the Uniform Commercial Code
William H. Lawrence
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence, William H., "Cure after Breach of Contract under the Restatement(Second) of Contracts: An Analytical Comparison with
the Uniform Commercial Code" (1986). Minnesota Law Review. 2570.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2570
Cure After Breach of Contract Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: An
Analytical Comparison with the
Uniform Commercial Code
William H. Lawrence*
INTRODUCTION
The adoption of a right to cure following the time for con-
tract performance has been hailed as one of the most innova-
tive provisions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC).1 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts2 also explicitly
recognizes the cure concept, 3 but its version has received sur-
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Professor of Law,
University of Toledo Law School.
1. See U.C.C. § 2-508 (1978). All references to the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) are to the 1978 Official Text and Comments. For commentary
on U.C.C. cure provisions, see V. COUNTRYMAN, A. KAUFMAN & Z. WISEMAN,
COMMERCIAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALs 957-58 (2d ed. 1982); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 8-4, at 318, 324 (2d ed. 1980); Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title
to Chattels: Pas4 Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REV. 697, 723
(1962); Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457, 473 (1949);
Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmapfor Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199,
210 (1963); Wallach, The Buyer's Right to Return Unsatisfactory Goods-The
Uniform Commercial Code Remedies of Rejection and Revocation of Accept-
ance, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 20, 24-28 (1980); Whaley, Tender, Acceptance, Rejec-
tion and Revocation-The UCC's "TARR"Baby, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 52, 55
(1974); Note, UCC Section 2-508: Seller's Right to Cure Non-Conforming
Goods, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 387, 388, 391 (1974); Comment, Uniform Commercial
Code: Minor Repairs or Adjustments Must Be Permitted by a Buyer When the
Seller Attempts to "Cure" a Non-conforming Tender of Merchandise, 52 MINN.
L. REV. 937, 938-39 (1968).
2. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Restatement are to
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237, 242 (1979). The Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts was undertaken in 1962 under the Reporter
leadership of the late Professor Robert Braucher. He resigned as Reporter in
early 1971 upon his appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth then served as Reporter until the com-
pleted work was adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute in
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prisingly little scholarly attention.4 Parties incur liability
under both the Code and the Restatement when a breach of
contract occurs; cure does not discharge that liability. Cure,
however, does serve to minimize the damages incurred by the
injured party and to preserve the breaching party's rights
under the contract by precluding the injured party from cancel-
ling the contract. Cure thus affords the breaching party a sec-
ond chance at contract performance, subject to the damages
occasioned by the initial breach.
This Article critically analyzes the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts approach to cure. Part I traces the evolution of the
cure concept from its sporadic common-law origin to its recog-
nition in the UCC and the Restatement. Part II articulates ra-
tionales advanced as the basis for the Restatement cure
provisions, arguing that the Restatement cure provisions are not
designed to mitigate the effects of the material breach doctrine,
but rather are based on the general contract principles of meet-
ing expectations and avoiding waste. Part III critically analyzes
the Restatement approach, considering problems of both drafts-
manship and substance. The Article concludes that problems
with the Restatement approach need not necessarily prove fatal
to the cure concept's place in the common law.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CURE CONCEPT
The cure concept originated in the traditional common law,
but it did not receive widespread attention until it was adopted
in Article 2 of the UCC. Section 237 of the Restatement also in-
corporates the cure concept and thus expands the concept into
general contract law.
A. THE TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW
The traditional common-law contract principles of per-
formance and breach of contract shape the rights and remedies
of the parties without regard to the concept of cure. Under the
standard common law, every breach of contract gives rise to an
May 1979. von Mehren, Preface: Robert Braucher and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 631, 631 (1981).
4. For two of the few discussions of the Restatement approach, see E.
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 8.15-.18, at 607, 610, 613-15, 617 (1982); Hillman,
Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach-Common Law Mitigation
Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 553, 594-97 (1976).
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immediate remedy.5 If the breach is material, the injured party
can sue for total breach and, in addition, terminate the con-
tract.6 If the breach is nonmaterial, however, the injured party
can sue only for partial breach, cannot stop further perform-
ance by the breaching party, and must perform the remainder
of his own contract obligation.7 Materiality of the breach is
thus relevant in determining both the extent of the injured
party's cause of action and whether the contract can be
terminated.
The availability of a cause of action for either total breach
or partial breach reflects the law's attempt to distinguish cases
of serious breach from those that are relatively minor.8 The
5. 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946, at 809 (1960).
6. Id. at 809-10 ("[W]herever the court will hold that A's breach is a total
breach, B can regard A's performance as at an end and at once maintain action
for damages for all of his injury, past, present, and future."). See Coughlin v.
Blair, 41 Cal. 2d 587, 598-600, 262 P.2d 305, 311-12 (1953) (failure to install pav-
ing and utilities within one year was treated as a total breach). See also RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1) (1932) ("any material failure of per-
formance by one party not justified by the conduct of the other discharges the
latter's duty to give the agreed exchange").
7. 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 946, at 811 ("For a partial breach the in-
jured party can maintain action at once; but he is not permitted to stop further
performance by the wrongdoer and get damages for the anticipated future
non-performance, as well as for the past non-performance constituting the par-
tial breach."). See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1) (1932); 6 S. WILLIS-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 829, at 80-81 (3d ed. 1962); see
also LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F.2d 152, 156 (4th Cir. 1947) (A seller's de-
parture from the terms of a delivery agreement was "so insignificant as to
come within the principle de minimis non curat lex. The seller ... was there-
fore entitled to recover the full contract price."); United States Plywood Corp.
v. Hudson Lumber Co., 113 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (contract
breaches did "not warrant rescission of the contract in the light of the length
of time that elapsed before the claim of rescission, the acts of affirmance of the
contract and the rule that breaches to be grounds for rescission must defeat
the object of the contract"), appeal dismissed, 210 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954).
8. 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 5, §§ 945-946. The first Restatement provides
the following rules for determining the seriousness of the breach, or in other
words, materiality of a failure to perform:
In determining the materiality of a failure fully to perform a
promise the following circumstances are influential:
(a) The extent to which the injured party will obtain the sub-
stantial benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated;
(b) The extent to which the injured party may be adequately
compensated in damages for lack of complete performance;
(c) The extent to which the party failing to perform has already
partly performed or made preparations for performance;
(d) The greater or less hardship on the party failing to perform
in terminating the contract;
(e) The wilful, negligent or innocent behavior of the party fail-
ing to perform;
1986]
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failure to perform any part of a promised contract performance
is a breach entitling the other party to damages caused by the
breach.9 All breaches are not of equal importance,10 however,
so the legal effect varies depending on whether the breach is
material or nonmaterial."
Materiality of the breach also is relevant to the determina-
tion of whether the injured party's performance is excused,
that is, whether the injured party can cancel the contract.
When the injured party's performance is constructively condi-
tioned on the other party's performance, 2 that condition must
be satisfied or the injured party's performance will be ex-
cused. 13 Rather than the standard of exact compliance needed
to satisfy an express condition,' 4 however, a constructive condi-
tion is satisfied by substantial compliance.' 5 Substantial compli-
ance is less than complete performance and thus constitutes a
breach of the contract,16 but it is sufficient to satisfy the con-
structive condition to the other party's performance obliga-
(f) The greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to per-
form will perform the remainder of the contract.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275 (1932).
9. 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 948, at 817; cf. E. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 4, § 8.8, at 575 ("Nothing less than full performance operates as a
discharge.").
10. 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 945, at 808.
11. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
12. Constructive condition has been described as follows:
A certain fact .. . may operate as a condition because the court be-
lieves that the parties would have intended it to operate as such if
they had thought about it at all, or because the court believes that by
reason of the mores of the time justice requires that it should so oper-
ate. It may then be described as a condition implied by law, or better
as a constructive condition.
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contrac 28 YALE L.J. 739, 743-44 (1919)
(emphasis in original). See generally Patterson, Constructive Conditions in
Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1942) (an exploration of the policy consider-
ations that underlie the process of identifying constructive conditions in
contracts).
13. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.9, at 581.
14. See 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 675, at 184; see, e.g., Friedman v.
Decatur Corp., 135 F.2d 812, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (agreement void unless prop-
erty "made available for industrial use with wharfage facilities and pipe line
privilege"); Lach v. Cahill, 138 Conn. 418, 421, 85 A.2d 481, 482 (1951) (contract
to purchase house contingent on securing a mortgage); see also RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1932).
15. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 241, 129 N.E. 889, 890
(1921); see J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 168, at 329 (2d ed. 1974). For
a discussion of the origin of the doctrine of substantial performance, see infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
16. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 11-22(b), at 412
(2d ed. 1977); 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 702, at 315.
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tion.17 Thus, substantial compliance results in a nonmaterial
breach and the injured party is precluded from terminating the
contract. In contrast, if the breaching party fails to meet the
constructive condition of substantial performance, the breach is
material and the injured party is excused from performance.1 8
Thus, the relationship between promises and constructive
conditions under traditional common law does not allow for the
concept of cure. When a party commits a material breach, the
constructive condition ordering performances 19 fails, permitting
the injured party to cancel the contract immediately. The op-
portunity and the necessary time to cure the breach are simply
not available under this conceptual framework. In the absence
of a contractual provision allowing a party to cure,
20 most
courts traditionally did not acknowledge such a right.21 The
cure concept did arise in the common law as a few courts al-
lowed some limited rights to cure,22 but these cases are the ex-
ception rather than the rule.23 As late as 1962, Professor
17. Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 241, 129 N.E. 889, 890
(1921). The New York court stated:
The courts never say that one who makes a contract fills the measure
of his duty by less than full *performance. They do say, however, that
an omission, both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for
by allowance of the resulting damage, and will not always be the
breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture.
1d.
18. J. MURRAY, supra note 15, § 168, at 329.
19. For development of the principles affecting order of performance, see
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.11, at 585-90; J. MURRAY, supra note 15,
§§ 159-165; 6 S. WILLISTON, supra note 7, § 817, at 30, §§ 829-831.
20. Sellers frequently include provisions for such rights in their sales con-
tracts. See Note, The Seller's Privilege to Correct an Improper Tender, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 1005, 1007 (1931).
21. Hawkland, supra note 1, at 718.
22. The most common limitation was that the cure had to occur within
the contract time for performance. See, e.g., McBath v. Jones Cotton Co., 149
F. 383, 386 (6th Cir. 1906) ("[IThe general rule is that a buyer may not reject a
delivery of goods conformable to the contract, when made in time, merely be-
cause there had been a prior offer of goods not receivable and rejected upon
that ground."); Emerson Shoe Co. v. Neely, 99 W. Va. 657, 662, 129 S.E. 718, 720
(1925) (early tender of goods by seller inadequate to support buyer's cancella-
tion of the contract). A right to cure after the contract time for performance
generally was not recognized. Hawkland, supra note 1, at 712; see, e.g., Mc-
Donnell Motor Hauling Co. v. Morgan Constr. Co., 151 Ark. 262, 265-66, 235
S.W. 998, 999 (1921) (buyer's refusal to pay not a breach when seller lacked
good title to steam shovel). Courts sometimes did recognize more extended
rights to cure. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 246, 189 N.E.2d 473,
475, 238 N.Y.S.2d 928, 932 (1963) (seller entitled to a reasonable time beyond
the time for performance to correct deficiencies in title to home).
23. Hawkland, supra note 1, at 711-12, 715-16, 718.
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William Hawkland reported that "cure as a device to rectify de-
fective tenders has never caught on."24
B. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The first extensive adoption of the cure concept came in
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-508, in its
entirety, provides:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected be-
cause non-conforming and the time for performance has not yet ex-
pired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to
cure and may then within the contract time make a conforming
delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or
without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably notifies the
buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender.
2 5
The broad right of the seller to cure under subsection (1) ap-
plies only when the seller tenders performance early and thus
has time remaining for performance during which to attempt
cure. The more important and innovative provision is subsec-
tion (2) because it allows a seller a reasonable time to cure be-
yond the time for performance stated in the contract. Both
provisions limit the right of the injured buyer to cancel the con-
tract by rejecting the seller's nonconforming tender.26
The seller's right to cure arises only upon the buyer's exer-
cise of the right to reject.27 UCC section 2-601 entitles a buyer
24. Id. at 711.
25. U.C.C. § 2-508.
26. A buyer may reject "if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract." U.C.C. § 2-601. When a buyer rightfully
rejects, the buyer, in addition to recovering damages, may cancel the contract.
U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
27. The cure provisions in § 2-508, as well as the accompanying comments,
clearly are applicable only following rejection by the buyer. Most commenta-
tors thus have indicated correctly that the right to cure does not extend to
cases of revocation of acceptance by the buyer under § 2-608. See J. WHITE &
R. SuMMERS, supra note 1, § 8-1, at 293; Hillman, supra note 4, at 586; Note,
Commercial Law-The Effect of the Seller's Right to Cure on the Buyer's Rem-
edy of Rescission, 28 ARK. L. REV. 297, 300-01 (1974) [hereinafter cited as AR-
KANSAS Note]; Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales-Section 2-508 and 2-
608-Limitations on the Perfect-Tender Rule, 69 MICH. L. REv. 130, 147 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN Note]; Note, Uniform Commercial Code-Re-
jection and Revocation-Seller's Right to Cure a Nonconforming Tender, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 938, 940-41 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WAYNE Note]. A few
commentators have tried to find support in the UCC provisions for the right to
cure after revocation. See Note, supra note 1, at 414-15; Comment, supra note
1, at 942-43. Courts occasionally have applied § 2-508 to revocation of accept-
[Vol. 70:713
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to reject a seller's performance "if the goods or the tender of
delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract."28 With
a rightful rejection, the buyer can cancel the contract, recover
any of the purchase price paid, and recover damages for total
breach. 29 The seller's proper notification to the buyer of an in-
tent to cure, however, has the legal effect of suspending the ef-
fectiveness of the buyer's rejection for a period no longer than
the remaining contract time under section 2-508(1) or a further
reasonable time under section 2-508(2).30 If the cure does not
conform to the contract specifications, other than time for per-
formance, the buyer can reject the tendered cure.3' The only
aspect of the perfect tender requirement32 that cure eliminates
is compliance with the time requirements when the cure is
made pursuant to section 2-508(2).
The aggrieved buyer must affirmatively exercise the right
to reject before the seller can have any right to cure. Section 2-
601 merely establishes the buyer's substantive right to reject
goods or deliveries that fail to conform to the contract. To ex-
ercise the right to reject, the aggrieved buyer must comply with
the procedural requirements of section 2-602(1), 33 which speci-
ance cases. See, e.g., Bartus v. Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d 3, 5-7, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222,
224-25 (Utica City Ct. 1967). Several commentators argue that sellers should
have the right to cure after revocation. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 586-87;
Whaley, supra note 1, at 75-76; Note, supra note 1, at 414-15; Comment, supra
note 1, at 942-43.
28. U.C.C. § 2-601. If the buyer accepts nonconforming goods rather than
rejecting them, the buyer is not required to accept a cure offer by the seller.
See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 957 (8th Cir. 1974). The buyer neverthe-
less is required to mitigate damages. id- at 957. See also Hillman, supra note 4,
at 586.
29. U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
30. See U.C.C. § 2-508. If the seller fails to go forward with a timely cure,
the buyer's original rejection will become effective again. A new conforming
tender, however, will cure the original nonconformity and will terminate the
right of the buyer to reject.
31. The initial rejection would cover only the initial tender by the seller.
The buyer also would have the right to reject the tender of the purported
cure. Section 2-508(2) allows the seller to cure by substituting a "conforming
tender," U.C.C. § 2-508(2), and § 2-601 allows a buyer to reject any goods or
tender that "fail in any respect to conform to the contract," U.C.C. § 2-601.
Section 2-106(2) provides that "[g]oods or conduct including any part of a per-
formance are 'conforming' or conform to the contract when they are in accord-
ance with the obligations under the contract." U.C.C. § 2-106(2).
32. See U.C.C. § 2-601. Section 2-601 states, in part, that "if the goods or
the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer
may ... reject the whole. .. ." Id-
33. For a thorough discussion of the distinction between the substantive
and procedural aspects of rejection, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1,
§ 8-3, at 314-15.
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fies that to be effective, the rejection must be within a reason-
able time after tender and the seller must be seasonably
notified. 34 A buyer waives the right to reject if the buyer pur-
posely or inadvertently accepts a nonconforming tender. A
buyer accepts tendered goods when, after a reasonable opportu-
nity to inspect them, the buyer indicates that "he will take or
retain them in spite of their non-conformity" 35 or the buyer
"fails to make an effective rejection. ' 36 The aggrieved buyer
who accepts a nonconforming tender can sue for the damages
caused by the seller's deviation from the contract terms,37 but
can no longer reject the goods. 38 The seller has no cure rights
when the buyer accepts.39
Section 2-508(2) has a further limitation on the right to
cure: the right applies only when the seller "had reasonable
grounds to believe" that the initial tender would be accepta-
ble.40 Comment 2 to section 2-508 states that "[s]uch reasonable
grounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of perform-
ance or usage of trade as well as in the particular circumstances
surrounding the making of the contract."'41 Thus Article 2 pro-
vides significant rights to cure, but not an automatic opportu-
nity to cure in all cases of breach by a seller.42
C. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts significantly
changed the responses that an injured party may make to a
34. U.C.C. § 2-602(1).
35. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(a).
36. U.C.C. § 2-606(1)(b).
37. U.C.C. § 2-714, 2-715.
38. "Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods ac-
cepted." U.C.C. § 2-607(2).
39. See supra note 28.
40. U.C.C. § 2-508(2).
41. U.C.C. § 2-508 comment 2. The comment stresses the underlying pol-
icy objective of the section: "Subsection (2) seeks to avoid injustice to the
seller by reason of a surprise rejection by the buyer. However, the seller is not
protected unless he had 'reasonable grounds to believe' that the tender would
be acceptable." I&L
42. Article 2 has additional provisions on cure in § 2-612 that govern non-
conforming deliveries made under installment contracts. Section 2-612(2) al-
lows the buyer to reject any installment whose nonconformity "substantially
impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured." U.C.C. § 2-612(2).
The buyer must accept the installment if the seller gives adequate assurance
of its cure. If the nonconformity with respect to one or more installment "sub-
stantially impairs the value of the whole contract," the buyer can cancel the
contract under § 2-612(3). U.C.C. § 2-612(3). This subsection precludes any
right of the seller to cure.
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breach of contract from those available under the first Restate-
ment of Contracts.43 The cure concept is incorporated in sec-
tion 237 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
provides in full as follows:
Except as stated in § 240, it is a condition of each party's remaining
duties to render performances to be exchanged under an exchange of
promises that there be no uncured material failure by the other party
to render any such performance due at an earlier time.44
Section 237 creates a condition to the duty to render perform-
ance, and nonoccurrence of the condition has two distinct possi-
ble effects. 45  First, as follows from the definition of
"condition,"46 the performance of the nonbreaching party does
not become due.47 The party whose duty is conditional is al-
lowed to suspend performance during the time that the condi-
tion has not occurred.48  For example, a promisor who
conditions the obligation to purchase a home on receiving a sat-
isfactory report on the absence of termite infestation is not obli-
gated to proceed before the inspection is made and a
satisfactory report is received. Second, the nonoccurrence of a
condition discharges the promisor's duty to perform when the
condition can no longer occur.49 The prospective home pur-
chaser would be excused from performance if an adequate ter-
43. The first Restatement of Contracts summarized the traditional com-
mon-law approach, discussed supra notes 5-24 and accompanying text. It
provided:
In promises for an agreed exchange, any material failure of perform-
ance by one party not justified by the conduct of the other discharges
the latter's duty to give the agreed exchange even though his promise
is not in terms conditional. An immaterial failure does not operate as
such a discharge.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 274(1) (1932).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979).
45. The effects of the nonoccurrence of a condition under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts are as follows:
(1) Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot become
due unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is excused.
(2) Unless it has been excused, the non-occurrence of a condi-
tion discharges the duty when the condition can no longer occur.
(3) Non-occurrence of a condition is not a breach by a party un-
less he is under a duty that the condition occur.
Id. § 225.
46. "A condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, un-
less its non-occurrence is excused, before performance under a contract be-
comes due." Id. § 224.
47. Id, § 225(1).
48. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.3, at 543-44.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(2) (1979). "The unex-
cused non-occurrence of a condition has two possible effects on the duty sub-
ject to that condition. The first effect always follows and the second often
1986]
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mite report was not provided during the time allowed for
occurrence of that condition.
Section 237 of the Restatement conditions each party's duty
to perform upon the absence of an "uncured material failure"
by the other party to perform a promised performance that was
due at an earlier time.50 Although material breach of such a
promise under traditional common law also results in failure of
the constructive condition ordering performance between the
parties, thereby enabling the aggrieved party to sue for total
breach and cancel the contract,5 ' the inclusion of the cure con-
cept in section 237 precludes these results from happening im-
mediately after the breach.52 Material breach under the
Restatement signifies nonoccurrence of the condition, which en-
ables the other party to suspend further performance, but the
duty of that performance will not be discharged until the condi-
tion can no longer occur.53 Section 237 thus envisions a time
does." IH § 225(2) comment a. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.3, at 543-
44.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979). Section 238 deals
with performances that are due simultaneously.
Where all or part of the performances to be exchanged under an ex-
change of promises are due simultaneously, it is a condition of each
party's duties to render such performance that the other party either
render or, with manifested present ability to do so, offer performance
of his part of the simultaneous exchange.
Id. § 238. Comment (a) to § 238 explains the relevance of such an offer to per-
form to the condition of § 237:
If a party actually performs, his performance both discharges his own
duty (Q 235(1)) and amounts to the occurrence of a condition of the
other party's duty (§ 237). But it is not necessary that he actually per-
form in order to produce this latter effect. It is enough that he make
an appropriate offer to perform, since it is a condition of each party's
duties of performance with respect to the exchange that there be no
uncured material failure by the other party at least to offer
performance.
Id. § 238 comment a.
51. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
52. J. MURRAY, supra note 15, § 167, at 326 ("Whatever the ultimate judi-
cial evaluation of the new Restatement change, there is a marked change in
the traditional rule of the old Restatement that once the determination is
made that a breach is material, the effect is to discharge the duty of the in-
jured party.").
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 comment a (1979). Com-
ment (a) reads as follows:
A material failure of performance has, under this Section, these ef-
fects on the other party's remaining duties of performance with re-
spect to the exchange. It prevents performance of those duties from
becoming due, at least temporarily, and it discharges those duties if it
has not been cured during the time in which performance can occur.
[Vol. 70:713
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period of "uncured material failure"54 following a material
breach during which the breaching party may cure the failure.
If the breaching party does cure during this time period, the
condition is then satisfied and the nonbreaching party must
proceed with performance. A failure to cure triggers the sec-
ond effect of the nonoccurrence; it discharges the nonbreaching
party's duty to perform. The inclusion of the cure element as
part of the condition precludes the nonbreaching party's right
to terminate the contract immediately upon material breach,
but permits that party to suspend the duty of performance until
the condition is satisfied through cure.55
Section 242 identifies several circumstances to be consid-
ered "[i]n determining the time after which a party's uncured
material failure to render or to offer performance discharges
the other party's remaining duties to render performance. '56
These circumstances determine the length of time available to
cure a particular breach. 57 Section 242 incorporates the same
circumstances provided in section 24158 for determining
whether a particular failure is material.5 9 Hence, both the ma-
54. Id- § 237.
55. For a thorough discussion of the power to suspend performance and to
terminate the contract under the Restatement, see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
4, §§ 8.15-.18.
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 (1979).
57. I& § 242 comment b. Comment (b) reads as follows: "This Section
states circumstances which are to be considered in determining whether there
is still time to cure a particular failure, or whether the period of time for dis-
charge has expired." Id.
58. Section 241 reads as follows:
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is
material, the following circumstances are significant:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the
benefit which he reasonably expected;
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately
compensated for the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived;
(c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer
to perform will suffer forfeiture;
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to
perform will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances
including any reasonable assurances;
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to per-
form or to offer to perform comports with standards of good faith and
fair dealing.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979).
59. Id § 242(a). Additional relevant circumstances under § 242 are "the
extent to which it reasonably appears to the injured party that delay may pre-
vent or hinder him in making reasonable substitute arrangements," id
§ 242(b), and
the extent to which the agreement provides for performance without
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teriality of a breach and the time period for cure are for the
most part determined by the same criteria. The circumstances
dealing with the aggrieved party focus on the extent of depriva-
tion of the benefit expected 6° and the availability of adequate
compensation.6 1 The circumstances focusing on the breaching
party include the extent of forfeiture suffered by the breaching
party,62 the likelihood that the breaching party will cure,63 and
the conformity of the breaching party's behavior with standards
of good faith and fair dealing.64
Thus, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
Uniform Commercial Code explicitly adopt the concept of cure,
a distinct departure from the traditional common law ap-
proach.65 Their approaches to cure, however, differ signifi-
cantly. The next section of the Article examines the rationales
underlying the concept of cure in order to determine the
sources of those differences.
II. THE RATIONALES FOR CURE
The search for the underlying rationale for a "second
chance" at contract performance under the cure concept has
suffered to some extent from misdirection. Professor Robert
Hillman states that "[t]he drafters of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts have attempted to lessen the impact of the mate-
rial breach doctrine" by precluding the injured party from ter-
minating the contract and restricting that party "to suspending
performance until it is too late for the breaching party to cure
the default. '66 A need to mitigate the harshness of the mate-
rial breach doctrine, however, is a shaky rationale for the cure
concept; cure is more firmly grounded in the general contract
delay, but a material failure to perform or to offer to perform on a
stated day does not of itself discharge the other party's remaining du-
ties unless the circumstances, including the language of the agree-
ment, indicate that performance or an offer to perform by that day is
important.
Id. § 242(c).
60. Id. § 241(a).
61. Id. § 241(b).
62. Id. § 241(c).
63. Id, § 241(d).
64. Id. § 241(e).
65. For a discussion of the common law approach, see supra notes 5-24
and accompanying text.
66. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 594. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, the
Reporter for the cure sections of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, cites
this passage with approval in his treatise on contracts. See E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 4, § 8.15, at 607 n.5.
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remedial principles of protecting expectations and avoiding
waste of resources, while also protecting the breaching party
against forfeiture of its contract rights.6 7 To understand the
differences between the Uniform Commercial Code and the Re-
statement versions of the cure concept and to assess the merit
of the Restatement approach, one must be able to articulate the
policies underlying the cure concept.
The alleged harshness of the material breach doctrine6 is
an inadequate justification for the second opportunity for per-
formance provided by the cure concept. The doctrine of mate-
rial breach is not inherently harsh. On the contrary, the
doctrine was established to prevent forfeitures by parties who
had substantially complied with the contract, but who had com-
mitted a relatively minor breach.69 The risk of forfeiture still
67. Hillman discusses protection of expectations and avoidance of waste in
the context of the uncertain extent to which the avoidable consequences rule
requires an injured party to accept new offers of performance made by the
party who materially breaches the contract. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 568-
70.
68. Hillman cites three examples of how "the material breach doctrine
often leads to unjust results." Hillman, supra note 4, at 563. A brief examina-
tion of these examples suggests that Hillman's assertion may be overstated.
The first example does not really involve the material breach doctrine: "par-
ties to a contract may specifically draft conditions in their contract which must
occur before the duty of counter-performance arises." Id Hillman uses a
"time is of the essence" clause in a construction contract as an illustration. Id.
If this condition is not met, the court may well be compelled to rule that the
party whose performance is conditioned is excused from performance. Yet the
condition in this case is an express condition. The material breach doctrine is
applicable only to constructive conditions. The Restatement recognizes that if
the parties make full performance an express condition in their agreement,
neither materiality nor cure can mitigate the effects of nonoccurrence of that
condition. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 comment d (1979).
A second supposedly harsh result of the material breach doctrine is that
"the trier of fact simply may fail to perceive that a breach did not substantially
deprive the injured party of what is bargained for." Hillman, supra note 4, at
563. The obvious harshness and inequity in this result, however, does not stem
from the material breach doctrine itself, but rather from its incorrect applica-
tion.
Hillman's last example of unfair hardship to the breaching party is a case
in which the circumstances change after a material breach-the breaching
party suddenly becomes either able or willing to provide at least partial per-
formance. Id. Yet no matter where the law chooses to define the final mo-
ment for contract termination or how many "second chances" the breaching
party receives, at some point the breaching party will be faced with the conse-
quences of a continuing material breach. Circumstances for breaching parties
may change after any point the law selects for contract termination.
69. In the famous 1773 opinion of Kingston v. Preston (paraphrased in
Jones v. Barkley, 2 Dougl. 684, 689-91, 99 Eng. Rep. 434, 437-38 (K.B. 1781)),
Lord Mansfield recognized the dependency of exchanged covenants through
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exists for parties who commit a material breach. The possibil-
ity of cure is a response addressed to this continued risk of for-
feiture.70 Focusing on the supposedly unjust results of the
material breach doctrine as a rationale for the cure concept
tends to discount the equitable nature of the doctrine and di-
vert attention from the proper conceptualization of the policies
supporting the cure concept. Implementing cure rights pro-
duces mitigating effects beyond those provided by the material
breach doctrine. The desirability of those effects, however, is
not self-evident. What contract and societal values are ad-
vanced by cure? How does cure affect the legitimate interests
of the contracting parties? One can discover the true rationale
for the cure concept by focusing on why this additional re-
sponse to the risk of forfeiture is desirable.
The true rationale for the cure concept can be found within
generally recognized principles of contract remedies. The con-
the process of implying a condition of the order for performance of the cove-
nants in the absence of an express provision in the parties' agreement. Only a
scant four years later, Lord Mansfield was forced in Boone v. Eyre, 1 H. Bi.
273, 126 Eng. Rep. 160(a) (K.B. 1777), to initiate an additional innovative doc-
trine to prevent the oppressive result that would follow from the traditional
requirement of strict compliance with conditions. Even though the breach
presented to the court was relatively slight, it was sufficient under the law ap-
plied to express conditions to result in the breaching seller's forfeiture of any
right to payment on the contract. Lord Mansfield mitigated this harsh impact
of the law of conditions by recognizing an easier standard for satisfying con-
structive conditions that has evolved and become embodied in the correlative
doctrines of substantial performance and material breach. See Jacob &
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
70. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. The law has developed
additional mitigating responses to nonliteral contract compliance. For in-
stance, a party who breaches a contract can nevertheless recover at the con-
tract rate for all of the units of a divisible contract that have been
substantially performed. See, e.g., Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corp., 314 Mass.
351, 357-58, 50 N.E.2d 59, 63 (1943) (contractor recovered for building 20 of the
promised 35 houses). Courts now also generally allow a breaching party who
cannot recover on the contract restitution for any benefit conferred on the
other party. The policy for restitution is stated well in Britton v. Turner, 6
N.H. 481 (1834). The Restatement also indicates that a court may excuse a con-
dition solely on the basis that a "disproportionate forfeiture" would result
otherwise. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 229 (1979). This pro-
vision, however, withholds such discretion from the courts if occurrence of the
condition "was a material part of the agreed exchange." Id Section 229 "is
intended to deal with a term that does not appear to be unconscionable at the
time the contract is made but that would, because of ensuing events, cause for-
feiture." Id § 229 comment a. See Jackson v. Richards 5 & 10, Inc., 289 Pa.
Super. 445, 433 A.2d 888, 895 (1981) (noncompliance with express conditions of
paying minor outstanding bills and providing evidence of loan application held
to be trivial in comparison with contract obligation to purchase business,
thereby precluding seller's right to exercise forfeiture clause).
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cept of cure is grounded in the belief "that protecting expecta-
tions while avoiding waste is, or should be, a primary goal of
contract damages." 71 The basis for the cure concept stems from
the notion that our remedial system encourages parties to enter
contracts72 by giving damages based on "the benefit of the bar-
gain" for disappointed expectations, 73 rather than trying to de-
ter contract breaches through compulsion or punishment.7 4
The protection of expectations is identified as a paramount
objective in the Restatement provisions on the law of contract
remedies.7 5 The compensation available to a disappointed
promisee, however, is limited by several principles, including
71. Hillman, supra note 4, at 555.
72. Remedies law for contracts under our legal system is not directed to
the question, "How 'can [people] be made to keep their promises?" but rather
to the question, "How can [people] be encouraged to deal with those who make
promises?" Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contrac4 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 1145, 1147 (1970). This approach reflects society's interests in contract
formation as a means of voluntary redistribution of resources. See Hartzler,
The Business and Economic Functions of the Law of Contract Damages, 6 AM.
Bus. L.J. 387, 389-92 (1968).
73. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 comment a (1932) ("In award-
ing compensatory damages, the effort is made to put the injured party in as
good a position as that in which he would have been put by full performance
of the contract.") Damages are measured as "the net amount of the losses
caused and gains prevented by the defendant's breach, in excess of savings
made possible." I&L § 329. "In short, the plaintiff may recover the value of the
defendant's promised performance. In general, this includes any loss resulting
in the ordinary course of events from the breach." Speidel & Clay, Seller's Re-
covery of Overhead Under UCC Section 2-708(2): Economic Cost Theory and
Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 681, 684 (1972).
74. Professor E. Allan Farnsworth is a principal proponent of this con-
tracts remedial approach. "Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of
promisors to prevent breach; rather, it is aimed at relief to promisees to re-
dress breach." Farnsworth, supra note 72, at 1147 (emphasis in original). For
discussion of punitive damages, see generally Hartzler, supra note 72, at 392;
Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IoWA L. REv. 307,
309 (1969); Simpson, Punitive Dasages for Breach of Contrac=4 20 OHIO ST.
L.J. 284 (1959); Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Real-
ity and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977).
75. The introductory note to the chapter on remedies in the Restatement
stresses the compensatory nature of contract remedies:
The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies has not been com-
pulsion of the promisor to perform his promise but compensation of
the promisee for the loss resulting from the breach. "Willful"
breaches have not been distinguished from other breaches, punitive
damages have not been awarded for breach of contract, and specific
performance has not been granted where compensation in damages is
an adequate substitute for the injured party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory note, ch. 16, at 100 (1979).
See also id, § 344 comment a (discussing the purposes of contract remedies).
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the avoidance of waste.76 Loss that could have been avoided
through reasonable efforts following breach is not compensa-
ble.77 The injured party is expected to minimize damages even
to the extent of taking "affirmative action to avoid loss by mak-
ing such substitute arrangements as are reasonable under the
circumstances. s78 Society depends heavily upon parties enter-
ing into contracts as a mechanism for voluntarily reallocating
resources, 79 and thus has an interest in remedial measures that
avoid excessive damages following a breakdown in the contrac-
tual relationship.80 Hence, in addition to the protection of ex-
pectations, the Restatement recognizes "the policy of
encouraging the injured party to attempt to avoid loss."8
In comparing the advancement of these policies through
the cure concept and through the avoidable consequences
rule,8 2 Professor Robert Hillman observes that "[p]ermitting
cure of material breach is exactly the purpose of the avoidable
consequences rule when applied to offers made by the breach-
ing party."83 Similar results do occur when the injured party
accedes to further performance by the breaching party under
either the cure concept or the avoidable consequences rule.
76. J. MURRAY, supra note 15, § 227.
77. The avoidance of economic waste is a major purpose behind limiting
recoverable damages to damages that can not be mitigated through reasonable
efforts. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.7, at 188-91 (1973);
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 33, at 127 (1935).
78. Farnsworth, supra note 72, at 1185-86. See D. DOBBS, supra note 77,
§ 12.6, at 826, and cases cited therein; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 77, § 39, at
140-41.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory note, ch. 16
(1979). See supra note 72.
80. Farnsworth, supra note 72, at 1183.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 350 comment a (1979).
"[D]amages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have
avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation." I& § 350(1). The Restate-
ment clearly applies the affirmative aspects of the avoidable consequences
rule: "Furthermore, [the injured party] is expected to take such affirmative
steps as are appropriate in the circumstances to avoid loss by making substi-
tute arrangements or otherwise." Id. § 350 comment b.
82. Hillman, supra note 4, at 555. Although Hillman focuses on the avoid-
able consequences rule, much of his discussion is applicable to an analysis of
the cure concept. The avoidable consequences doctrine prompts injured par-
ties to avoid losses from contract breaches by entering into reasonable substi-
tute agreements. It precludes recovery of damages for breach that could have
been avoided through alternative reasonable steps. See, e.g., Rock v. Vandine,
106 Kan. 588, 189 P. 157 (1920); McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y.
347, 351, 169 N.E. 605, 606, modified, 253 N.Y. 533, 171 N.E. 770 (1930). For a
more detailed explanation of cure and the avoidable consequences rule, see 5
A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 1039; J. MURRAY, supra note 15, § 227.
83. Hillman, supra note 4, at 594.
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Cure under the Restatement corrects the material nature of the
breach, precluding cancellation of the contract. The injured
party is entitled to the damages caused by the partial breach,
but the breaching party avoids paying the additional damages
associated with total breach. Under the avoidable consequences
rule, the material nature of the breach of the original contract
is unchanged, but if the injured party accepts the breaching
party's offer to continue performance on the contract, a miti-
gating substitute transaction is created. Subsequent perform-
ance by the breaching party avoids the loss that would be
associated with nonperformance, thereby reducing the extent
of damages actually suffered by the injured party. Both the
cure concept and the avoidable consequences doctrine promote
the objectives of contract remedies; the injured party is ade-
quately compensated by recovery of all the damages that could
not be avoided.
If the aggrieved party wrongfully refuses to permit further
performance by the breaching party, however, the legal conse-
quences under the two approaches differ significantly.
Although ease of expression often leads people to refer to a
duty to mitigate damages arising from the avoidable conse-
quences rule, the expression actually is inaccurate.8 4 The in-
jured party who unreasonably fails to mitigate will be
precluded under the avoidable consequences rule from recover-
ing those damages that could have been avoided, but the in-
jured party will not be liable to the other party.8 5 Cure under
the Restatement functions differently. The breaching party has
a right to take steps to correct at least some of the deficiencies
causing the breach and thereby lessen the extent of damage
suffered by the injured party. The injured party who interferes
with the free exercise of that right breaches the implied prom-
ise of nonprevention.8 6 This breach can make the injured party
liable for total breach of contract, even though the other party
84. J. MURRAY, supra note 15, § 227, at 460 n.68; Farnsworth, supra note
72, at 1184; Hillman, supra note 4, at 554 n.1.
85. J. MURRAY, supra note 15, § 227, at 460 n.68.
86. 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 5, § 767. Preventing the other party from
performing is a violation of the duty of good faith. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 204, 205, 235, 245 (1979); J. MURRAY, supra note 15, § 187. See,
e.g., Tracy v. O'Neill, 103 Conn. 693, 699-700, 131 A. 417, 419 (1925) (broker en-
titled to commission when seller prevented execution of written contract);
Barron v. Cain, 216 N.C. 282, 284, 4 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1939) (abuse and assault by
grand-uncle prevented nephew from performing promise to care for him).
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committed the first material breach.8 7
The substantive right to cure, therefore, extends the bene-
fits of cure beyond the benefits of the avoidable consequences
rule. In addition to providing a mechanism to minimize the ex-
tent of damages suffered by the injured party, the right to cure
affords the breaching party the opportunity to correct the ma-
terial nature of a breach and thus retain the right to demand
the other party's performance under the contract. In this way
the cure concept goes beyond the avoidable consequences rule
in preventing forfeiture of contract rights by the breaching
party.
The cure approach advances the policies of contract reme-
dies law to a greater extent than does the avoidable conse-
quences rule because it better protects the breaching party's
expectations of minimizing damages and precluding contract
cancellation. Just as people are encouraged to contract by an
expectation of remedies for breach that compensate them for
the actual, unavoidable loss of the benefit of their bargains,88 a
similar incentive stems from the expectation that in the event
of their own breach they will be responsible only for the actual,
unavoidable losses their breach causes. This expectation is ful-
filled by both the cure concept and by the avoidable conse-
quences rule. The unavoidable losses caused by the breach are
the most extensive in cases of material breach because a mate-
rial breach destroys the essential value or purpose of the con-
tract to the injured party,8 9 thereby justifying cancellation of
the contract. Cure of a material breach, unlike the avoidable
consequences rule, reinstates the essence of the contract, and
thereby fulfills the breaching party's expectations of both mini-
mizing damages and precluding contract cancellation. The pre-
vention of forfeiture associated with cure of a material breach
is appropriate because such prevention can be realized while
fully protecting the injured party's expectations and avoiding
waste. Cure thus mitigates both the injured party's damages
and the breaching party's loss of contract rights.
The cure approach is better able to effectuate the policies
87. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.15, at 610; infra text accompany-
ing note 156.
88. See supra note 72.
89. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 16, § 11-22, at 410-11. See J.
MURRAY, supra note 15, § 167. A New York court noted: "Nowhere will
change be tolerated. . . if it is so dominant or pervasive as in any real or sub-
stantial measure to frustrate the purpose of the contract." Jacob & Youngs,
Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921).
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underlying the law of remedies in the Restatement than is the
avoidable consequences rule because the cure approach in-
cludes an additional incentive. The prospect of liability for ma-
terial breach for interference with the breaching party's cure
rights should encourage an injured party to allow a breaching
party to cure even in instances in which the injured party
might have been willing to forego damages by refusing the
breaching party's new offer of performance under the avoidable
consequences rule. Consider the following illustration. Builder
falls into a dispute with Owner and wrongfully withdraws his
work force from the job site, thereby materially breaching the
contract between them. Upon recognizing the error, Builder
seeks to cure by resuming work under an accelerated schedule,
desiring to retain Owner's contract obligation for remaining
payments of $10,000. Owner is so incensed by Builder's actions,
however, that Owner wishes to have nothing further to do with
Builder, even though completion of the project will require
paying another contractor an additional $1,000 that Owner can-
not recover because of the avoidable consequences rule. This
contract with a new contractor would be undesirable in view of
the policies of the Restatement because it would promote waste
through a misallocation of resources.90 The cure concept adds
an additional incentive to refrain from pursuing this alterna-
tive. In addition to not recovering the additional money ex-
pended to complete the project, Owner would be liable to
Builder for the benefit of the bargain remaining under the
contract.
This additional incentive accompanying cure not only
makes actual waste avoidance more likely, it also helps elimi-
nate the punishment motive, a motive that the Restatement dis-
associated from the law of contract remedies.9 ' An injured
party's refusal to deal further with the breacher often can stem
from a desire to punish the breacher or secure revenge because
of the breacher's "bad" actions. The viability of the avoidable
consequences rule has been seriously impeded as a waste avoid-
ance mechanism in cases in which breaching parties extend
new offers of performance, because many courts have let simi-
lar punishment considerations infiltrate their decisions.92
90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 72-73
and accompanying text for a discussion of the compensatory nature of contract
remedies.
92. See Hillman, supra note 4, at 559-60 n.31, 561 n.34 and cases cited
therein.
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"Such decisions often view the contract breaker as one who
should not be 'rewarded' for the breach by 'requiring' the in-
jured party to accept the new offer."93 By punishing the
breacher, these decisions ignore the objectives of compensating
injured parties and avoiding waste by compelling contract per-
formance. The cure concept under the Restatement makes it
more difficult for courts to promote punishment objectives, and
more expensive for spiteful injured parties to refuse further
performance by the breaching party.
Increasing the incentive for injured parties to mitigate
losses by deeming them breaching promisors if they refuse cure
does not necessarily lead the cure approach to violate the policy
against compelling breaching promisors to meet contract obliga-
tions. An injured party may have more legitimate reasons than
spite for wanting to preclude cure by the breacher. The injured
party may no longer need or desire the contract performance,
or if the performance is still desired, it may be available on bet-
ter terms than under the contract. The injured party is not
compelled to allow the breacher to continue, but rather is sim-
ply required to compensate the other party for damages occa-
sioned by a denial of the opportunity to exercise cure rights.
The cure concept thus is consistent with the principle of eco-
nomic efficiency 94 reflected in the Restatement policy of pro-
tecting expectations: "a party may find it advantageous to
93. Id. at 560.
94. According to this principle, a breach of contract will result in a
gain in 'economic efficiency' if the party contemplating breach evalu-
ates his gains at a higher figure than the value that the other party
puts on his losses, and this will be so if the party contemplating
breach will gain enough from the breach to have a net benefit even
though he compensates the other party for his resulting loss, calcu-
lated according to the subjective preferences of that party.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS reporter's note, ch. 16 (1979). The spe-
cific principle is known as the "Kaldor Compensation Principle." See Kaldor,
Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility,
49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). Legal analysis of the principle is now quite extensive.
See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.1 (2d ed. 1977); Bir-
mingham, Breach of Contrac4 Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic
Rationality: The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DuKE L.J. 49; Coleman, Effi-
ciency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach
to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980); Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 509 (1980); Farber, Reassessing the Eco-
nomic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contrac 66 VA. L.
REV. 1443 (1980); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); Kennedy & Michelman, Are
Property and Contract fficient, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711 (1980); Polinsky, Eco-
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refuse to perform a contract if he will still have a net gain after
he has fully compensated the injured party for the resulting
loss." 9 5
The cure concept has yet another advantage over the avoid-
able consequences rule as a means of avoiding waste by al-
lowing further performance by the breaching party; it is easier
to apply. Uncertainties tend to dilute the effectiveness of the
avoidable consequences rule when it is applied to new offers of
performance extended by the breaching party.96 In addition,
application of the rule is complicated by issues such as whether
the injured party waives rights under the original agreement by
accepting the new offer,97 the applicability of the preexisting
duty rule,98 and which types of damages fall within the scope of
the rule.99
The rationale supporting the Restatement cure concept
thus is tied to the Restatements policies underlying the law of
remedies for breach of contract. Cure not only promotes pro-
tection of contract expectations and avoidance of waste, but also
prevents forfeiture of the contract rights of the breaching
party. The Reporter to the Restatement provisions on cure and
remedies has explained the accompanying equitable effects of
the material breach doctrine and the cure concept:
It is in society's interest to accord each party to a contract reasonable
security for the protection of his justified expectations. But it is not
in society's interest to permit a party to abuse this protection by using
an insignificant breach as a pretext for avoiding his contractual obli-
gations .... [Courts] curb abuse of [the] power to suspend by denying
the injured party the power to exercise it if the breach is immaterial,
so that minor breaches will not disrupt performance. Courts also en-
courage the parties to keep the deal together by allowing the injured
party to terminate the contract only after an appropriate length of
time has passed. They restrain abuse of this power to terminate by
denying the injured party the power to exercise it hastily, so that not
all delays will bring the contract to an end, and the party in breach
will be afforded some time to cure his breach.1 0 0
The rationales that support the codification of the cure
nomic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product. A Buyer's Guide to Pos-
ner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1655 (1974).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs introductory note, ch. 16
(1979).
96. The reluctance of many courts to even apply the rule under these cir-
cumstances has been noted previously. See supra notes 92-93 and accompany-
ing text.
97. Hillman, supra note 4, at 564-67, 571-72 and cases cited therein.
98. Id. at 565-67, 573, and cases cited therein.
99. Id. at 574-76 and cases cited therein.
100. E. FARNswORTH, supra note 4, § 8.15, at 607.
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concept in the Uniform Commercial Code differ from the pol-
icy objectives of cure in the Restatement. Waste avoidance con-
sistently secured through a reduction in damages resulting
from cure by the breaching party is not a Code objective be-
cause the right to cure is not available if the aggrieved party ac-
cepts the defective tender or delivery and seeks money
damages.1° ' The right to cure applies only when the buyer re-
jects the tender because of the seller's noncompliance with the
contract requirement. 0 2
By limiting cure to the rejection context, the UCC drafters
apparently were concerned primarily about the adverse impact
of forfeiture in sales contracts. A buyer who accepts goods can
recover damages for nonconformities, but must still pay the
purchase price for the goods, 10 3 so there is no forfeiture of the
breaching party's contract rights. Following a proper rejection
of goods, however, the injured party can cancel the contract,
thereby cancelling the other party's contract rights, in addition
to recovering damages.10 4 Because the seller's performance
must comply with the perfect tender rule under the UCC, 0 5
cancellation is possible, in the absence of cure, even in cases of
nonmaterial breach. As the Reporter of the Restatement has
pointed out, cure "is more important to a seller of goods, who is
subject to the perfect tender rule, than it is to a builder under a
construction contract, who already has the benefit of the doc-
trine of substantial performance.' u0 6
The UCC cure provision also differs in that it apparently
requires a higher standard of commercial behavior than does
the Restatement.10 7 The UCC's right to cure, allowed only in
cases of rejection by the buyer, applies after the time for con-
tract performance only if "the seller had reasonable grounds to
believe [that the nonconforming tender] would be accepta-
ble."' 08 This limitation restricts the availability of cure to cases
of conformity with this prescribed behavior. Breaching parties
101. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
102. U.C.C. § 2-508. See supra note 27.
103. U.C.C. §§ 2-714, 2-607(1).
104. U.C.C. § 2-711(1).
105. U.C.C. § 2-601.
106. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.17, at 614.
107. See Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Eq-
uity, and the Second Restatement 81 COLuM. L. REV. 111, 113-16 (1981); cf
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) ("The duty to
keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages
if you do not keep it, - and nothing else.").
108. U.C.C. § 2-508(2).
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who do not comply are, essentially, punished through denial of
an opportunity to cure. The Restatement does not restrict the
availability of cure to cases in which the breaching party had
reasonable grounds to believe his performance would be accept-
able. Thus, the rationales supporting the provisions for cure
under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts also differ in the degree of commercial rea-
sonableness expected of the parties.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURE CONCEPT IN THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
Although the extension of the cure concept into general
contract law is a sensible development, the actual approach
taken in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts presents some
serious drafting and substantive problems. These problems are
likely to adversely affect the courts' adoption of cure.
A. PROBLEMS IN DRAFTNG
The drafting of the Restatement unduly intertwines the
cure concept with other fundamental contract concepts. Sec-
tion 237 makes lack of an "uncured material failure"10 9 a condi-
tion to the other party's duty to perform. With one word, it
combines the innovative cure concept with the traditional con-
cepts of material breach and constructive conditions ordering
performance. 1 0 This extreme "efficiency" in drafting probably
will prevent the cure concept from receiving the attention it de-
serves. Section 237 so closely resembles the traditional material
breach doctrine that courts can be expected to cite the section
while continuing to decide the cases in the usual way. "Uncured
material failure" in practice is likely to be read "material
failure."
The drafting of section 242 of the Restatement enhances
the possibility of this intertwining of the cure concept and the
material breach doctrine. Section 242 specifies the circum-
stances that are significant in determining how much time
must pass before one party's uncured material failure to per-
form discharges the other party's remaining duties to perform;
section 242 essentially focuses on the time during which cure
will be allowed."'- Section 242 primarily invokes the five cir-
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979).
110. For a discussion of the traditional concepts, see supra notes 6-7, 19 and
accompanying text.
111. RESTATEENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 comment b (1979) ("This
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cumstances of section 241, the section used to determine
whether a breach is material.1'2 This presentation of identical
circumstances in adjoining sections to determine both material
breach and the time allowed to cure inevitably will contribute
further to a hardened coalescence of these concepts in many
minds. In practice, the cure concept will be easy to ignore and
the Restatement is therefore less likely to serve as a catalyst
for widespread recognition of cure in contracts that are outside
the scope of the UCC.
The drafting problems are compounded by the fact that the
area of contract law affected by the cure concept includes some
of the most complicated contract doctrines. The consequences
of nonperformance of a contract promise are interrelated with
a number of concepts, and the issues raised can become quite
complex. The temptations to continue applying traditional
analysis to these problems and to ignore the cure concept will
be great. Cure will be easy to ignore given the lack of attention
drawn to it. Decisionmakers focusing on the question predict-
ably will conclude, because of the tight drafting of the Restate-
ment, that no significant change in the law was intended by
inclusion of the reference to cure. The desire to maintain the
known status quo will be enormous. Even persons inclined to
give general credence to cure will be hesitant to venture forth
when they are uncertain of how cure fits conceptually into the
traditional framework of contract law. Better drafting would
have helped to avoid confusion over the cure concept.
Poor decision making in cases involving the cure concept
under the UCC113 should have alerted the drafters to the need
to expand the Restatement's implementation of the concept.
Spurred by the wide array of scholarly statutory construction
analyses of section 2-508,114 the courts' applications of the sec-
Section states circumstances which are to be considered in determining
whether there is still time to cure a particular failure, or whether the period
of time for discharge has expired.").
112. See id. § 242(a).
113. See Schmitt & Frisch, The Perfect Tender Rule-An "Acceptable" In-
terpretation, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1375, 1380 (1982). These commentators noted:
What is surprising is the manner in which the courts have avoided,
circumvented, and otherwise ignored the specific requirement of sec-
tion 2-508(2) that before a seller may have time, in addition to that
agreed to for performance, in which to cure a nonconforming tender,
he must have made such tender reasonably believing that it would be
acceptable to the buyer.
Id.
114. One commentator argues that the right to cure under § 2-508(2) is
available only to sellers who know their tender is nonconforming but reason-
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tion 2-508 cure provisions of the UCC have been inconsistent
and confusing.115 The courts' treatment of the subject has led
two respected commentators to conclude that "[h]ow one gener-
alizes from the... cases... is not clear."1 16 Given this confu-
sion under the UCC approach to cure, a general reference in
the Reporter's Note to section 237 of the Restatement stating
that the term "cure" is broader than it is under section 2-508 of
the UCC1 17 is inadequate to alleviate the lingering uncertainty
over the application of cure under the Restatement. This obser-
ably believe that their buyer nevertheless will find it acceptable. R. NORD-
STROM, LAW OF SALES 319-22 (1970). Another commentator would allow cure
when the buyer will not face "any great inconvenience, risk or loss." Hawk-
land, supra note 1, at 724. Other commentators apply a "magnitude of the de-
fect" test, restricting cure to relatively minor defects. Wallach, supra note 1,
at 28; Whaley, supra note 1, at 57-59; infra notes 148-152 and accompanying
text. Another study provides three interpretations of the "with or without
money allowance" clause of § 2-508(2). Peters, supra note 1, at 211-12. An-
other approach focuses on the good faith of the parties as the standard for in-
terpretation. Note, supra note 1, at 400. Professors James White and Robert
Summers, however, provide the best statutory construction analysis:
[A] seller should be found to have had reasonable cause to believe
that his tender would have been acceptable any time he can convince
the court that (1) he was ignorant of the defect despite his good faith
and prudent business behavior, or (2) he had some reason such as
prior course of dealing or trade usage which reasonably led him to be-
lieve that the goods would be acceptable.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 8-4, at 322. Their additional argument
in favor of requiring injured buyers to accept money allowances is not, how-
ever, grounded in the statutory language. See id. at 322-23. For a synopsis of
all of these positions, see Schmitt & Frisch, suira note 113, at 1376-80.
115. See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 252 Ark. 601, 607, 480 S.W.2d 133,
137 (1972) (proceeds to question of reasonable time to cure without discussing
right to cure); Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848, 850 (D.C. 1967) (citing Hawk-
land, supra note 1, at 724 for the proposition that cure is allowable when buyer
will not face great inconvenience, risk or loss); Johannsen v. Minnesota Valley
Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Minn. 1981) (limits cure rights to minor
defects); Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 457-58, 240 A.2d
195, 204 (1968) (proceeds directly to question of adequacy of proffered cure
without discussing seller's right to cure); Bartus v. Riccardi, 55 Misc. 2d 3, 6,
284 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224-25 (N.Y. City Ct. 1967) (apparently emphasizes good
faith). One commentator has suggested that with judicial gloss on section 2-
508, "[c]ure has . . .become discretionary." Miniter, Buyer's Right of Rejec-
tiow" A Quarter Century Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Recent
International Developments, 13 GA. L. REv. 805, 835 (1979).
116. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 8-4, at 321.
117. The reporter's note states: "The term 'cure' is used in a broader sense
than in Uniform Commercial Code § 2-508, to include performance by one
party before the other party's remaining duties of performance have been dis-
charged, even though the other party has a claim for damages for partial
breach because of the delay." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237,
reporter's note (1979).
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vation is all the more pertinent due to the substantial differ-
ences between the Restatement provisions on cure and the UCC
provisions.118
Comments by scholars who have focused on the cure provi-
sions of the Restatement vividly demonstrate the confusion that
the chosen drafting is capable of producing. Professors John
Calamari and Joseph Perillo refuse to adopt the "uncured ma-
terial breach" terminology "because it appears to complicate
the problem."119 They argue that "[a] breach is either material
or immaterial, and it is clear that a breach which is immaterial
may become material by remaining uncured for a period of
time."120 Professor Robert Hillman suggests that "[s]ince the
factors set forth for determining when a breach is material [sec-
tion 241] are 'similar' to the factors listed for determining when
the injured party's duties are discharged [section 242], the Re-
statement (Second) approach may merely change terminology,
not substance." 12 ' He also speculates that "[ilt may be that
breaches previously held to be immaterial constitute material
breaches under the new Restatement, entitling the injured
party to suspend performance but not cancel."'122 When schol-
ars as capable as these are forced to speculate about the mean-
ing of the Restatement cure provisions, the drafting of the
provisions becomes suspect. The problem stems from drafting
that lashes the cure concept so tightly to traditional doctrines
that it is difficult for cure to attain the separate identity so nec-
essary for its acceptance. While tight drafting ordinarily is a
praiseworthy virtue, in this instance tightness may choke the
innovation the drafting seeks to promote.
Because the cases decided since the promulgation of the
Restatement do not pose circumstances in which the opportu-
nity to cure was demanded and refused, discerning the judicial
reaction to the cure provisions is somewhat speculative. The
opinions in most of the cases decided to date do not include any
application of the cure concept. 2 Courts citing section 237124
118. See supra notes 25-64 and accompanying text.
119. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 16, § 11-22(a), at 408 n.41.
120. Id.
121. Hillman, supra note 4, at 594 n.218.
122. Id
123. One court, in dicta, states the essence of section 237, including the ref-
erence to cure, and the circumstances in which cure could have been relevant.
Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 539-40, 681 P.2d 1010, 1014-15
(1984). The court, however, never reached the issues of cure or even breach,
because it found that the evidence of a purported contemporaneous oral con-
tract was insufficient. Id at 541, 681 P.2d at 1016.
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generally use it as authority for the proposition that a material
breach by one party excuses further performance by the other
party, but the courts fail to give any consideration to the cure
concept in these cases.12 This consistent failure prompts the
suspicion that courts are disregarding the relevance of the cure
concept and omitting it entirely from their legal analysis in
these cases, but until the facts of cases force courts explicitly
either to recognize or deny a right to cure, one cannot be cer-
tain whether courts are ignoring the cure concept or not.
In continuing to apply the traditional common law doctrine
in these cases while invoking the authority of section 237 of the
Restatement, courts are demonstrating that they do not appre-
ciate the role of the cure concept in section 237. If courts did
recognize the import of this role in section 237, they could ap-
ply the concept quite easily. The Connecticut case of Vesce v.
Lee12 6 is illustrative. The parties held property as tenants in
124. The earliest cases referencing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
cite the comparable provision in the tentative draft. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 262 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973).
125. Admittedly, cure was probably impossible to effectuate in some of the
cases. For example, in one case the breaching lessor vacated the premises ad-
joining the leased property and rented those premises to another retail busi-
ness. See Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d
22, 24 (Iowa 1978). The court found that the parties had entered into a conces-
sion lease arrangement wherein the principal host store benefited the smaller
enterprise by generating customer traffic and thus increasing the smaller re-
tailer's gross sales. It held that the plaintiff impliedly covenanted to continue
operating its business on the adjacent premises during the term of the sub-
lease, and that it materially breached that covenant, excusing any obligation
for further rental payments. Id. at 29. Another case in which cure would ap-
pear to have been impossible is Todd v. Heekin, 95 F.R.D. 184 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
There, the court cited § 237 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as the
legal standard in the event of a breach. Id. at 186. Due to issues of fact in con-
troversy, the court denied cross-motions for summary judgment. Id. The al-
leged breach was that plaintiff's attorney had improperly disclosed terms of
the parties' antitrust settlement agreement. Id. at 185.
In other cases, cure might have been possible, but apparently was not at-
tempted; at least the courts did not discuss cure. In one such case, a plaintiff
under contract to provide investigation services materially breached the con-
tract because the business was not licensed to conduct such business in Massa-
chusetts. See Harness Tracks Sec., Inc. v. Bay State Raceway, Inc., 374 Mass.
362, 365-66, 373 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1978). The court felt that the prospect of the
defendant's liability for torts of unlicensed personnel was sufficient to estab-
lish material breach. Id. In another case an architect breached his employ-
ment contract by engaging in a pattern of behavior including tardiness,
absence, acting without prior employer consent on company business, and per-
forming private architectural work without bringing the business into the
company. See Stokes v. Enmark Collaborative, 634 S.W.2d 571, 573-74 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982).
126. 185 Conn. 328, 441 A.2d 556 (1981).
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common, and the defendant agreed to purchase the plaintiff's
interest for $13,830. The written agreement required the de-
fendant to pay $10,000 immediately and the balance within one
year, but the defendant never tendered payment of the $10,000,
and the plaintiff sued for a partition by sale seven months
later.127 Those seven months clearly provided a more than ade-
quate period during which to cure the breach, so the court eas-
ily could have found an uncured material breach. 28 Instead,
without making any reference to the cure concept, the court
adopted the trial court's conclusion that, under section 237, the
breach terminated the contract.129
The court in Vincenzi v. Cerro130 also missed an opportu-
nity to apply the cure analysis. In that case, the defendant
agreed to pay $91,000 in five installments as work progressed on
the house that plaintiff agreed to build on defendant's land. 131
The defendant refused the plaintiff's demand for the final pay-
ment in August on the grounds that the work was not com-
pleted and that some of the work was defective.132 In the suit
by the builder, the trial court concluded that because the por-
tion of unperformed work was so minimal, the builder had sub-
stantially performed and was entitled to recover the fifth
installment minus the cost of completion. 133 The appellate
court affirmed this conclusion. 34 Interestingly, the trial court
found that work performed by the builder was not completed
and approved until November, although the contract contem-
plated completion in March and final payment was demanded
in August.135 If the performance in August was not substantial,
the uncured material breach would have entitled the defendant
to suspend his final payment but the builder would have been
allowed time to cure the deficiencies. The court might then
127. Id at 330-31, 441 A.2d at 557.
128. The Supreme Court of Virginia had a similar opportunity to find an
uncured material breach in R. G. Pope Constr. Co. v. Guard Rail of Roanoke,
Inc., 219 Va. 1, 244 S.E.2d 74 (1978). Plaintiff was held to have materially
breached the implied obligation to not prevent the defendant from performing,
thereby excusing defendant's promised performance. Id at 118, 244 S.E.2d at
779. The court could have indicated that the plaintiff's delay for nearly one
year constituted an adequate time in which to cure. The court, however, did
not discuss cure.
129. Vesce, 185 Conn. at 334-35, 441 A.2d at 559.
130. 186 Conn. 612, 442 A.2d 1352 (1982).
131. Id. at 614, 442 A.2d at 1353.
132. Id.
133. Id at 614, 442 A.2d at 1354.
134. Id. at 617, 442 A.2d at 1355.
135. Id. at 614, 442 A.2d at 1353.
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have been inclined to hold that the cure provided during No-
vember was timely, thereby satisfying the condition to the de-
fendant's obligation to pay. The defendant thus would have
been entitled to suspend his performance, but not to cancel it.
The court constrained its application of section 237, however, to
the use of comment (d), which simply applies the axiom that
the substance of section 237 applies equally to cases in which
the issue is posed in terms of whether the party whose per-
formance is due first has substantially performed or whether
the breach by that party is material.136 The court simply ig-
nored the cure concept.
These initial ventures by courts into section 237 of the Re-
statement do not bode well for the successful implementation
of the cure concept in general contract law. Although one can-
not be certain of the judiciary's reaction to cure until the issue
is presented directly, the omission of cure analysis in the mate-
rial breach cases citing and discussing section 237 shows that
the courts have not yet embraced it. When courts do confront
claims based on cure, the drafting of the Restatement enhances
the likelihood that they will decide these cases using the famil-
iar traditional contract concepts.
One possible explanation for the drafters' understated in-
corporation of the cure concept could be the overall desire to
defuse the "controversy over the extent to which the rules for-
mulated in the restatements should reflect a judgment as to
what the law is, as distinguished from what the law should
be."' 37 Professor E. Allan Farnsworth succinctly stated his po-
sition when he indicated that "it scarcely behooves the Re-
porter of a restatement to proclaim too often that he is engaged
in innovation.' 38 The method of adopting the cure concept sat-
136. Id. at 616, 442 A.2d at 1354 (applying comment (d) to § 237 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts). Comment (d) reads:
A typical example is that of the building contractor who claims from
the owner payment of the unpaid balance under a construction con-
tract. In such cases it is common to state the issue, not in terms of
whether there has been an uncured material failure by the contractor,
but in terms of whether there has been substantial performance by
him. This manner of stating the issue does not change its substance,
however, and the rule stated in this Section also applies to such cases.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 comment d. See also Measday v.
Kwik-Kopy Corp., 713 F.2d 118, 123 (5th Cir. 1983) (question of sufficiency of
employee's performance under a contract was phrased in terms of whether
employee had substantially performed).
137. Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, 81 CoLUm. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981).
138. Id at 6.
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isfies the incentive to create at least an impression of conform-
ity with the prior law and may have been calculated to divert
recognition of it as an addition to general contract law.
If this reason was a motivating factor, it seems misplaced in
this instance. The drafters could have avoided the controversy
of whether they were adding to the law by recognizing that
cure depends for its authority in primary part on a UCC provi-
sion and then they could have extended its application to gen-
eral contract law by analogy. This would have been preferable.
A similar approach was taken in Restatement section 208, which
extends by analogy the UCC section 2-302 provisions on uncon-
scionability, and in Restatement section 251, which follows the
same course with respect to the UCC section 2-609 provisions
on the right to demand assurances of performance.139 Focusing
on the cure concept, the Reporter does acknowledge in subse-
quent writings that the cure idea has been incorporated by
analogy from the UCC,14o but his main emphasis is on demon-
strating its foundation in prior case law.141 A separate Restate-
139. Id. at 11.
140. See id. ("The ideas of 'cure' and [some damages concepts] have also
been used by analogy."); see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.17, at 613-
14. In this treatise, Professor Farnsworth states:
Although the concept of cure was known before the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the Code must be credited with giving a seller of goods
a clear right to cure and with popularizing the word cure in this con-
text. The Code provisions on cure apply only to contracts for the sale
of goods, but they may be applied by analogy to other contracts.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
The only specific reference to cure in the reporter's note to § 237, how-
ever, is as follows: "The term 'cure' is used in a broader sense than in Uni-
form Commercial Code § 2-508, to include performance by one party before
the other party's remaining duties of performance have been discharged, even
though the other party has a claim for damages for partial breach because of
the delay." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237, reporter's note
(1979). Compare the explanations for the adoption of the concepts of uncon-
scionability and the right to demand assurances: "[IMn some instances the Re-
statement (Second) incorporates by analogy a new rule that depends largely on
a Code rule for its authority." Farnsworth, supra note 137, at 11.
141. The reporter's note to § 237 cites one case, Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d
242, 189 N.E.2d 473, 238 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1983), and two famous treatises, 3A A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 657-660, 675, 677-678, 700-702, 762 (1960 &
Supp. 1980); 6 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 820-
828, 839, 841-842 (3d ed. 1962). These authorities, however, do not represent
the force of the traditional caselaw. See supra note 24 and accompanying text
and supra note 52.
Several of the cases cited in Reporter E. Allan Farnsworth's treatise on
contracts, E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, §§ 8.15-8.16, at 610-13, do not actually
involve the right to cure or to suspend performance. See, e.g., Continental
Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Ark. 1951), modified,
[Vol. 70:713
CONCEPT OF CURE
ment section, comparable to sections 208 and 251 which extend
UCC analogies, would have facilitated the separate identifica-
tion of the cure concept that is essential to its successful
implementation.
In addition, the drafters were influenced, most likely, by
the need to fit the desired legal effects of cure into the concep-
tual framework of contract law. The cure concept converts the
traditional common law of material breach from allowing im-
mediate discharge of the aggrieved party to allowing temporary
suspension of further performance followed by discharge only
if a timely cure is not provided. Conceptually, both the suspen-
sion and the discharge had to be tied to the constructive condi-
tion making the breaching party's performance due before the
performance of the aggrieved party. The Restatement accom-
plishes the desired results very efficiently by including both
material failure and lack of cure as elements of the construc-
tive condition, thereby establishing the dual effects of the non-
occurrence of a condition. The material failure to perform
allows the suspension; the failure to cure the material breach
triggers the discharge.
These conceptual objectives, however, could have been re-
alized just as well through drafting that provides a separate sec-
tion for the cure concept. The substance of section 237 would
be preserved by making the constructive condition a material
failure that is not cured as defined in the separate section on
cure. This change is purely one of form, not substance. It is
one that would be neither necessary nor desirable if the draft-
ers were working on a blank slate to codify desirable law. The
Restatement's efficient drafting under those circumstances
would be worthy of envy and emulation. But the Restatement
is not a codification and it reflects a substantial body of prior
law. The drafting, therefore, would have been improved with a
separate section on cure, just as Article 2 of the UCC provides
separate sections for rejection and cure. The change, although
minor, would have had a major influence in drawing attention
to the cure concept and in promoting its useful application.
The drafters did provide separate sections detailing the cir-
cumstances to be employed in determining material breach and
the circumstances to be used in determining the time available
199 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1952); Zulla Steel v. A & M Gregos, 174 N.J. Super. 124,
415 A.2d 1183 (1980); Wasserburger v. American Scientific Chem., Inc., 267 Or.
77, 514 P.2d 1097 (1973); Aiello Constr. v. Nationwide Tractor Trailer Training
& Placement Corp., 122 R.I. 861, 413 A.2d 85 (1980).
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to effectuate cure. This was certainly necessary to avert hope-
less chaos, but the use of identical circumstances in immedi-
ately adjoining sections that contain concepts comprising the
condition of section 237142 inevitably contributes to lingering
confusion. The drafting still promotes the forseeable tendency
to coalesce the concepts of materiality and cure. Even if identi-
cal circumstances for determining the two concepts are appro-
priate,143 the inclusion of the circumstances for resolving the
cure issue in the suggested separate section on cure would pro-
mote further recognition that cure is a separate concept from
material breach and one that requires its own individualized
determination.
The drafting of the cure provisions in the Restatement can-
not be faulted from a technical standpoint. It is efficient and
incorporates the cure concept into the conceptual framework of
contract law in an ingenious fashion. The fact that the drafting
is in a restatement, however, is the basis for the criticism lev-
eled at it here. The drafters expanded the cure concept into
general contract law, but rather than emphasizing the exten-
sion by analogy to a UCC provision, the drafters purport to be
merely restating traditional contract principles. The drafting
scheme strongly reinforces the "continuation-of-current-law"
impression and does not provide the identification of the cure
concept needed for its successful implementation. The failure
of the judiciary to date to embrace the cure concept"44 demon-
strates the validity of this criticism.
B. PROBLEMS IN SUBSTANCE
The cure provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts also suffer from some serious substantive shortcomings.
These problems have an adverse impact upon the realization of
the objectives of contract remedies. They appear to have been
overlooked by the drafters.
The Restatement unfortunately limits the applicability of
cure to cases involving a material breach. The cure concept is
introduced in section 237, which makes an "uncured material
failure" to render performance a condition to the duties of the
other party whose performance is due later. 45 Consequently,
142. For a list of these circumstances, see supra note 58.
143. See infra notes 168-175 and accompanying text for assertion of a con-
trary position.
144. See supra notes 123-136 and accompanying text.
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979).
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parties who materially breach their contracts are entitled to
cure, but parties who commit only lesser, partial breaches are
not. The omission of cure rights in cases of partial breach is in-
consistent with the waste avoidance rationale that underlies
cure in the Restatement. Although damages are not as great in
cases of partial breach, waste still can be avoided by curing
those breaches.146 The availability of cure for partial as well as
material breaches would protect expectations because the in-
jured party still would be entitled to damages for ultimate
losses, and it would also avoid additional waste.
The approach of the Restatement stands in stark contrast
to case law and commentary under the UCC. The UCC does
not base availability of cure on the nature of the breach, but
ironically, several courts147 and commentators 148 have con-
tended erroneously that it does not apply to cases of material
breach. The language of section 2-508(2) restricts cure after the
contract time for performance has passed to cases in which "the
seller had reasonable grounds to believe [the non-conforming
tender] would be acceptable."'149 The courts and commentators
that automatically preclude use of section 2-508(2) for material
breaches unwarrantedly apply a "magnitude of the defect" test
for determining the reasonableness of the seller's belief, al-
lowing cure for minor but not major defects. 150 This approach
does not incorporate the factor of the seller's belief of the ac-
ceptability of the tender and therefore does not reflect the stat-
utory language. The seller's right to cure is not precluded
automatically just because the defect in the tender is material,
and, conversely, the right to cure does not follow under the
Code just because the tendered defect is relatively minor.,5 1
146. Furthermore, the likelihood of successful cure is probably higher for
partial breaches as a whole than for material breaches.
147. See Johanssen v. Minnesota Valley Ford Tractor Co., 304 N.W.2d 654,
657 (Minn. 1981); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W.Va. 453, 459, 184
S.E.2d 722, 725 (1971).
148. See Schmitt & Frisch, supra note 113, at 1387; Wallach, supra note 1,
at 28; Whaley, supra note 1, at 57-58; Comment, Sales of Personal Property-
Breach of Warranty-Repair as a Means of Cure Under Section 2-508 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 53 IowA L. REV. 780, 783 (1967); see also W. HAWK.
LAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 141 (3d ed. 1976) (The "effect and purpose [of
§ 2-508(2)] is to prevent the buyer from forcing the seller to breach by making
a surprise rejection of the goods because of some minor nonconformity at a
time at which the seller cannot cure the deficiency within the time for
performance.").
149. U.C.C. § 2-508(2).
150. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
151. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERs, supra note 1, § 8-4, at 322 n.81; Hillman,
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Extension of the cure concept to both material and partial
breaches could have been accomplished easily under the Re-
statement. A separate section on cure again would have been
helpful. That section would recognize a general right to cure,
thus allowing cure for material and nonmaterial breaches. The
constructive condition currently provided in section 237 still
would be preserved; the condition would be a material failure
that is not cured where cure is determined by using the sepa-
rate cure section of the Restatement. This extension of the
availability of cure to cases involving nonmaterial breaches
would have been desirable.
The Restatement approach also does nothing to alleviate
the additional dilemma that the cure concept adds to the con-
siderable burden injured parties already bear under the mate-
rial breach doctrine. Material breach has been a difficult
standard for injured parties because often it is not easily deter-
mined. The line between material and nonmaterial cannot be
drawn with any degree of exactitude; it depends on balancing a
number of factors, which may suggest contrary results, in a
case-by-case approach.152 Injured parties have had to apply this
wavering material breach standard to decide when the breach-
ing party has gone far enough to allow termination of the con-
tract relationship. The Restatement requires injured parties to
apply those identical inexact factors to decide not only that a
breach is material but also how much time the breaching party
must be allowed to cure the breach. 153 The injured party now
bears this burden of line-drawing both in electing to suspend
and in choosing to terminate the contract.
The price of erroneously determining whether a breach is
material or how much time the breaching party should receive
to cure the defect is high. A Michigan court in Walker & Co. v.
Harrisonl54 vividly stated the danger of responding to a breach
as material:
[T]he injured party's determination that there has been a material
supra note 4, at 579-80, 589; Miniter, supra note 115, at 835; Peters, supra note
1, at 210; Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the Consumer Buyer, 75 CoM.
L.J. 354, 357-58 (1970); ARKANSAS Note, supra note 27, at 303; MICHIGAN Note,
supra note 27, at 135-36; Note, supra note 1, at 400; WAYNE Note, supra note
27, at 949; Comment, Substantial Performance: The Real Alternative to Perfect
Tender Under the U.C.C., 12 Hous. L. REV. 437, 443 (1975).
152. For a list of these factors, see supra note 58.
153. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (1979) (factors
for determining whether breach is material) with id. § 242(a) (factors for de-
termining time allowed for cure).
154. 347 Mich. 630, 81 N.W.2d 352 (1957).
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breach, justifying his own repudiation, is fraught with peril, for
should such determination, as viewed by a later court in the calm of
its contemplation, be unwarranted, the repudiator himself will have
been guilty of material breach and himself have become the aggres-
sor, not an innocent victim.1 5 5
The same risk now accompanies a determination that sufficient
time to cure has passed, justifying the injured party's termina-
tion of the contract. Even if the other party commits a material
breach, the aggrieved party who terminates the contract will be
liable for total breach of contract if a court later determines
that the time allowed for cure was not long enough.1 56 Yet, fail-
ure of an injured party to respond to a material breach by sus-
pending performance or to respond to an excessive time to cure
by terminating the contract constitutes a waiver of those rights.
The additional burdens cast upon the injured party by the
cure requirements of the Restatement do not always disappear
following correct determinations as to materiality of the breach
and the time allowed to cure it. When the breaching party does
attempt to cure, the injured party again must analyze that
party's performance with respect to the material breach stan-
dard. A cure that completely remedies the breach does not pose
a problem; but a less than complete cure raises the issue of
whether there is still a material breach or whether the breach-
ing party has now substantially performed, thus making the
breach nonmaterial. If the breach is upgraded to nonmaterial,
the constructive condition is satisfied by cure just as it would
have been if substantial performance had been rendered ini-
tially.157 Therefore, the injured party only has a cause of action
for partial breach and is not allowed to terminate the contract.
In a close call on the adequacy of the cure provided by the
breaching party, the injured party again faces the difficult ma-
terial breach question and the dangerous consequences of an er-
roneous decision.
These burdens are alleviated considerably, although not
completely, for buyers under the UCC. The uncertainty as to
the time to cure is comparable because under section 2-508(2)
155. Id at 635, 81 N.W.2d at 355.
156. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.15, at 610.
157. The comments to the Restatement confirm that a cure does not have
to provide exact compliance in correcting deficiencies to be effective: "Even if
the failure is material, it may still be possible to cure it by subsequent per-
formance without a material failure. In the event of cure the injured party
may still have a claim for any remaining non-performance as well as for any
delay." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 comment b (1979).
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the seller is given only a reasonable time to cure.158 The appli-
cation of the perfect tender rule rather than the material
breach/substantial performance standard,159 however, gives the
injured buyer more predictable criteria to use in deciding how
to respond to both a nonconforming tender and the tendered
cure.160 Even a performance standard requiring full compliance
with the contract specifications, however, cannot always elimi-
nate all doubts, but such a standard is easier to cope with than
trying to target the variable range of substantial performance
based upon multiple, potentially conflicting criteria. Injured
parties' determinations of when they can be discharged from
their contract obligations thus are more difficult under the Re-
statement than under the UCC.
The Restatement could have alleviated the injured party's
burden somewhat by requiring the breacher to provide ade-
quate assurances that performance is forthcoming before re-
ceiving an opportunity to cure.161 The necessary use of the
material breach standard162 precludes use of the perfect tender
rule of the UCC, but the uncertainty associated with determin-
ing the length of time that must be allowed for cure before the
158. U.C.C. § 2-508(2). See, e.g., Marine Mart, Inc. v. Pearce, 252 Ark. 601,
607, 480 S.W.2d 133, 137 (1972); Transcontinental Refrigeration Co. v. Figgins,
179 Mont. 12, 21, 585 P.2d 1301, 1306 (1978).
159. "Substantial performance is a term of law which conveys little, if any,
meaning to the lay mind and ordinarily sends the lawyer to his digests to dis-
cover the most recent illustrations of its judicial use." Steel Storage & Eleva-
tor Constr. Co. v. Stock, 225 N.Y. 173, 179, 121 N.E. 786, 787 (1919).
160. Contra Honnold, supra note 1, at 472 ("Experience, it is believed,
shows that this is one of the areas in the law where it is impossible to escape
questions of degree, and that, as Justice Holmes was fond of saying, any ap-
pearance of exactness is an illusion." (footnote omitted)).
161. The adequate assurances requirement would be analogous to § 2-609 of
the UCC. See generally Note, A Right to Adequate Assurance of Performance
in All Transactions: U.C.C. § 2-609 Beyond Sales of Goods, 48 S. CAL. L. REv.
1358 (1975).
162. Concern over the risk of forfeiture prevents application of the perfect
tender rule to a wide range of cases. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 8.12, at
593. In contracts for services such as building contract cases, the nonconform-
ing performance usually cannot be returned to the breaching builder. See E.
FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 891-92 (3d
ed. 1980). As the New York court in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239,
129 N.E. 889 (1921) stated:
There will be harshness sometimes and oppression in the implication
of a condition when the thing upon which labor has been expended is
incapable of surrender because united to the land, and equity and rea-
son in the implication of a like condition when the subject-matter, if
defective, is in shape to be returned.
Id, at 242, 129 N.E. at 890-91. Predictability had to be sacrificed to achieve jus-
tice by preventing forfeiture in these cases.
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aggrieved party is allowed to terminate the contract could be
addressed. In many cases a requirement of adequate assurances
could ease significantly the difficulty of this determination. If
assurances are not provided, the injured party obviously would
not need to wait for cure. When assurances are provided, the
breaching party would have indicated in advance the steps
planned to correct the deficiency and the envisioned timetable.
This information would not clear up injured partys' doubts in
all instances, but they generally would be better off with
knowledge of the breacher's intentions and abilities to cure
than they would be without such knowledge.
Depending upon the circumstances that led to the breach,
the requirement of adequate assurance before cure rights are
triggered would have to be liberally construed in some cases.
Compare the situation in which the breacher simply refuses to
pay with the case in which the breacher is temporarily unable
to pay. In the former case, precise and convincing assurances
would be necessary, whereas assurances indicating probable
success should be sufficient in the latter case. If the insolvent
breacher can demonstrate the likelihood of reversing its bad fi-
nancial position, the assurances should be adequate, but they
would not be adequate if based on nothing more than hopes for
better success in the future. If an adequate assurances require-
ment is not liberally construed in these types of cases, cure
would be available only for parties who currently have the abil-
ity to perform.
Requiring a breaching party to provide adequate assurances
of performance in order to secure the right to cure would have
the additional advantage of eliminating waste that the Restate-
ment approach promotes. In many cases the breaching party
will have neither the desire nor the ability to effectuate a cure.
The Restatement nevertheless takes an across-the-board ap-
proach under which the injured party upon a material breach is
allowed initially only to suspend performance. The injured
party is not discharged until the possibility of cure can no
longer occur. The delay in discharge that occurs when the
breaching party either cannot or does not intend to cure in-
creases the likelihood that the injured party's damages will be
increased needlessly. If the breaching party was required to
provide adequate assurances of cure to preclude discharge of
the contract following a material breach, the injured party
would be in a better position to act expeditiously to mitigate
damages in situations in which cure is improbable.
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The Restatement does not ignore this problem of delay, but
rather attacks it primarily through provisions affecting the
length of time for cure instead of affecting the availability of
the cure right. The only occasion when there is no time al-
lowed for cure is when "timely performance is so essential" as
to preclude any delay in discharge.163 Thus the Restatement
usually provides an opportunity to cure following a material
breach.164 The circumstances that affect the length of time for
cure recognize the delay problem by including "the likelihood
that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances includ-
ing any reasonable assurances"1 65 and "the extent to which it
reasonably appears to the injured party that delay may prevent
or hinder him in making reasonable substitute arrange-
ments.' 66 These factors certainly address the problem of dam-
ages increased through delay in a situation in which cure is
improbable. In addition to leaving the burden of assessing
these factors on the injured party, however, these factors do
not attack the waste avoidance problem as directly as an initial
requirement for adequate assurances of cure would. Therefore,
they are not likely to be as effective.
The final substantive problem with the Restatement cure
provisions is the inclusion of some of the circumstances used to
determine the length of time allowed for cure. Cure should be
allowed as long as the objectives upon which it is premised can
be advanced. Some of the five circumstances made relevant
through section 242(a)-the identical circumstances for deter-
mining materiality of a breach 167 -- are inappropriate. The es-
sential consideration is whether the injured party can be
compensated adequately for being deprived of any of the bar-
gained-for benefit.168 The extent of forfeiture169 should not be
balanced against uncompensable loss because the prevention of
forfeiture through cure should be available only when the rea-
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 comment a (1979).
164. Id ("Ordinarily there is some period of time between suspension and
discharge, and during this period a party may cure his failure.").
165. Id § 242(a) (§ 242(a) includes this factor by referring to § 241, in which
this factor appears as subsection (d)).
166. Id. § 242(b).
167. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242(a) (1979) (§ 242(a) in-
cludes this factor by referring to § 241, in which this factor appears as subsec-
tion (b)).
169. Id § 242(a) (§ 242 includes this factor by referring to § 241, in which
this factor appears as subsection (c)).
[Vol. 70:713
CONCEPT OF CURE
sonable expectations of the injured party can be protected
through compensation for losses incurred through the
breach.170 As long as forfeiture can be avoided through cure
and the injured party can be made whole through compensa-
tion, cure is appropriate. Similarly, the extent to which injured
parties are deprived of bargained-for benefits' 71 should be irrel-
evant, the issue being whether injured parties can be ade-
quately compensated for deprivations of expected benefits, be
they large or small. The desirability of requiring adequate as-
surances of cure as a prerequisite to the availability of the cure
right, as discussed above,172 obviously means that adequate as-
surances are an appropriate consideration for determining the
time allowed for cure.373 Because all parties to contracts are
bound to an implied obligation of good faith in the performance
and enforcement of the contract,174 consideration of the
breacher's cure actions in view of that standard 75 is also an ap-
propriate consideration affecting the time permitted for cure.
Therefore, the Restatement circumstances for determining the
time allowed for cure that are objectionable are the extent to
which the injured party is deprived of the bargained-for benefit
and the extent of forfeiture the breacher might otherwise
incur.
Thus, despite the Restatement (Second) of Contracts admi-
rable adoption of the cure concept, the actual language adopted
suffers from some serious deficiencies. The drafters could have
enhanced greatly the value and workability of cure if they had
addressed these problem areas.
CONCLUSION
The incorporation of the cure concept in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts is the latest step in the evolution of the
right of a breaching party to correct a deficient tender of per-
formance. Sporadic attempts to develop cure occurred previ-
170. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
171. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242(a) (1979) (§ 242(a) in-
cludes this factor by referring to § 241, in which this factor appears as subsec-
tion (a)).
172. See supra text following note 161.
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242(a) (1979) (§ 242(a)
includes this factor by referring to § 241, in which this factor appears as sub-
section (d)).
174. Id § 205.
175. Id § 242(a) (§ 242(a) includes this factor by referring to § 241, in which
this factor appears as subsection (e)).
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ously in the common law, but courts generally allowed injured
parties to terminate the contract after a material breach, with-
out any opportunity for the breacher to cure the deficiencies.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code provided the first
extensive recognition of cure rights. Now the Restatement pro-
vides that an aggrieved party should be able to terminate a con-
tract only following an uncured material breach.
The extension of the cure concept to contracts other than
those for the sale of goods under the UCC is desirable. It
serves to avoid economic waste by mitigating damages that
would otherwise be recoverable against the breacher. At the
same time, however, it protects the reasonable expectations of
the injured party because all damages that are not avoidable
are recoverable. Cure makes this protection as well as waste
avoidance available while also preserving the breaching party's
continuing rights under the contract.
Despite the desirability of the cure concept, its expression
in the Restatement raises troublesome problems. The drafting
so tightly intertwines the cure concept with contract principles
of conditions, material breach, and the factors for determining
material breach that it does not provide adequate identification
of cure to promote its adoption and application by the judiciary.
The present failure of courts to apply the cure concept adds
credence to this observation. The substance of the Restatement
cure provisions also presents serious problems, including the
limitation of cure to cases of material breach, the failure to al-
leviate the additional burden that cure imposes on injured par-
ties in determining the appropriate response to breach, and the
use of identical factors to determine both the materiality of a
breach and the time allowed to cure a material breach.
Although all of these problems represent serious shortcom-
ings that detract from the likelihood of widespread utilization
of the cure concept, they need not prove fatal. Scholars can
draw attention to the cure concept and promote its expanded
application. If cure receives additional attention in legal litera-
ture, the extremely tight drafting of the cure concept in the Re-
statement should not hinder the use of the provision.
Moreover, when courts do begin to apply the cure concept, they
can alleviate the substantive difficulties. The Restatement does
not control a court as a statute does, so the courts should exer-
cise their discretion in developing cure through the evolution of
case law. The cure concept will then be recognized as a wel-
come addition to the basic principles of general contract law.
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